The Study of UNSC Structure and Reform for Effective Imposition of International Sanctions

Authors

  • David Kim Newton Academy Seoul Korea

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.47577/ijitss.v4i.132

Abstract

This paper analyzes the structural flaws of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and their impact on the effectiveness of international sanctions. It focuses on the rivalry among permanent members (P5), particularly China and Russia, and examines how veto misuse and conflicting national interests hinder the UNSC’s ability to enforce sanctions effectively. Through case studies of North Korea and Russia, the research demonstrates how P5 self-interest undermines collective decision-making, reducing UNSC sanctions to unilateral state actions. The paper concludes that reforms, such as revising the veto system and addressing power rivalries, are crucial for enhancing the effectiveness of UNSC sanctions and strengthening global governance.

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Published

2025-01-13

How to Cite

Kim, D. (2025). The Study of UNSC Structure and Reform for Effective Imposition of International Sanctions . International Journal of Instruction, Technology and Social Sciences, 4(1), 48–60. https://doi.org/10.47577/ijitss.v4i.132